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Abstract
As Northern Ireland's landmark Good Friday Agreement approaches its 20-year anniversary, one site looms
particularly large in the memories and perspectives of men and women who lived through the civil conflict
known as the Troubles. The remains of HM Maze Prison stand unoccupied and unused while Northern
Ireland debates how this polarizing historical landscape figures into the population's recovery from historical
violence.
The Maze Prison/Long Kesh housed paramilitary prisoners from 1971 to 2000. A brief review of the prison
history suggests that far from being placed "out of site, out of mind," its prisoners, employees, and
administration retained an active role in the violence of the Troubles. Today the Maze Prison/Long Kesh
serves as more than a reminder of a dark era; it is also a hotly contested cultural landscape. In the debate over
the future of what remains of the prison campus, competing political perspectives have yielded proposals that
prescribe drastically different approaches to the community's recovery. The prison site, perceived variably as a
threat to the peace process, a minimum requirement for peace, a historical obligation, and an economic
opportunity, waits in limbo for a political agreement regarding the extent to which the landscape should be
put to recreational, commercial, historical, and civic use.
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In May of 2015, over 100,000 visitors traveled to Lisburn, Northern Ireland for the 
Balmoral Agricultural Show. The Royal Ulster Agricultural Society calls its annual 
three-day fair a show of “healthy competition, good sportsmanship, family fun and 
community spirit,” drawing crowds from Belfast, the rest of Northern Ireland, and 
the Republic of Ireland (O’Toole 2014). Exhibitor spaces for sheep-shearing, pig 
handling, and showings of horses, cattle, and poultry attract the biggest numbers. 
The event’s convivial atmosphere quickly dissipated in the evenings of the 2015 
show, however, as visitors waited in exiting traffic for up to two and a half hours. 
Amidst intermittent tirades of abuse, parking attendants directed creeping lines of 
cars to the country roads leading from the grounds (Black 2015). Balmoral Park 
lacked the infrastructure to accommodate the 30,000 nightly visitors it had received, 
and the reason was simple: the surrounding roads were not designed to host a large 
public exhibition center.  
On the contrary, for decades this corner of Lisburn was developed specifically to 
keep the public out. In 1971, the British government closed its Royal Air Force 
airfield on the site and redeveloped the facilities into the Long Kesh detention 
center. In response to the growing civil conflict in Northern Ireland, commonly 
known as the Troubles (1969-1998), it would later become HM Prison Maze, a high-
security prison whose infamous legacy of sectarian violence remains hotly contested 
today.  
As a symbol of an era of history that many witnesses would like to re-write, the 
Maze presents today’s Northern Irish society with a tremendous challenge: the task 
of responsibly dealing with a landscape of trauma. A thorough historical 
understanding of the Maze/Long Kesh is necessary in order to understand this task 
as both a burden and an opportunity. This article illustrates how the prison landscape 
played a unique role in the conflict in Northern Ireland, one that has rendered it a 
possible – but deeply contentious – platform for promoting global peace and aiding 
reconciliation between Northern Irish communities. 
Historical Context: The Troubles 
A growing body of work on the Maze that delineates the site as contested ground 
requires us to consider the roles of memory, interpretation, and eradication in dealing 
with troubled pasts (McAtackney 2014, Dowell 2009, Flynn 2011).  However, these 
important discussions are best held with a detailed eye to the specifics of the Maze’s 
history. To focus only on the mere facts of “pain and shame” (Logan and Reeves 
2009) during the conflict ignores what William Sewell Jr. terms the “eventful 
temporality” (Sewell Jr. 2005) of the historical circumstance – in this case, Northern 
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Ireland’s Troubles and the defining episodes of the Maze. Sewell defines an event as 
a product of an established social structure or structures, which in some way 
transforms the structure from which the event deviates (2005, 227). Although 
Northern Ireland’s civil conflict during the latter half of the 20th century is generally 
understood as a thirty-year affair, the social structures and unrest that bred it—and 
that bred the Maze Prison—are centuries old. The oscillation between periods of 
violence and relative peace in Ireland saw the Cromwellian confiscation of Gaelic 
land in the 1600s, the Protestant Ascendancy, economic restrictions and penal codes, 
eras of rebellion, concessions, the abolishment of Irish Parliament in 1801, the 
campaign for Home Rule over a century later, and the Ulster Covenant justifying the 
use of force if Home Rule became a serious threat. By the time Ireland partitioned in 
1921-22, three centuries of English residency in Ireland had divided populations of 
the northern counties who considered themselves British-Irish, or considered 
themselves simply Irish. This divide split Northern Ireland along several identity 
lines: national (Irish/British), religious (Catholic/Protestant), political (Separatist 
(Nationalist)/Unionist), and sectarian (Republican/Loyalist). Census records show 
correlations, but not absolute 1:1 relationships, between citizens’ religions, their 
constitutional politics, and extralegal military activity. On the heels of Irish 
independence in what is now the Republic, many citizens of the upper counties 
considered the partition to be vital to the retention of their “distinctive Protestant 
heritage and British way of life” (Ryder 2000, 122). In the decades following 
partition, Unionists frequently expressed their Irish identity in terms of Protestant 
landowning history, the planter tradition as a foundation for industrial development 
in the north, a struggle to resist the sprawl of the Catholic Church, and voluntary 
involvement in World War I (Boyce 1996).  
However, the minority Nationalist community in Northern Ireland—that is, 
citizens in favor of an Irish Ireland—protested Unionists’ preferential treatment, 
particularly better housing and job opportunities and voting laws that favored rich 
homeowners (Gudgin 1999). This sense of alienation and oppression reignited an 
escalation of violence reminiscent of the unrest that followed Irish partition and Civil 
War. Between the late 1960s and early ‘70s, ethno-nationalist groups such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA, synonymous with militant Separatism) and the Loyalist 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) ordered targeted hits and car bombings, retaliations 
and counter-retaliations—all of which contributed to a culture of urban violence, 
exacerbated by riots and random shootings. 
In response to this heightened paramilitary activity, British troops arrived in 
Northern Ireland in 1969. The Troubles would see many more years of civil 
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disruption. Civilians and sectarian groups established sanctuaries and no-go zones, 
barricading and partitioning residential areas. Children in Northern Ireland, as in 
other embattled cities, became accustomed to running through contested 
neighborhoods (Cairns 1987). The Provisional IRA targeted commercial British-Irish 
business in protest of what it termed an “artificial economy of the six-counties (Bell 
2000).” No sooner would Separatists be granted concessions by the British 
government than Loyalist paramilitaries would target British infrastructure in protest. 
The UVF received a tremendous amount of intelligence from allegedly neutral 
British police, and so were aided in carrying out attacks on Separatists’ families; the 
IRA became infamous for its attacks on civilians in British governmental or police 
employment (Edward and Bloomer 2008; Fay 1997). Ultimately political violence, 
incurred by Republicans, Loyalists, and British/Northern Irish security forces, 
resulted in nearly 3,500 deaths in the thirty-year conflict (McKeown 2009; Sutton 
1994). The amount of people harmed by the Troubles, including both casualties and 
injuries, is of course, much greater—an estimated 2% of the Northern Irish 
population. 
As attacks and retaliations between opposing paramilitary groups upended 
civilian society, chronic unemployment and a severe housing shortage plagued the 
most populated parts of Northern Ireland, augmenting and feeding the crisis 
(Cameron 1969; Gudgin 1999). In north and west Belfast, residents in contested 
areas risked losing their homes to arson. In some cases, the educated or wealthy 
residents of a city relocated to adjacent suburban counties rather than risk the 
uncertainty of urban warfare and redevelopment (Plöger 2004, 16). As the 
Loyalist/Unionist majority and Republican/Separatist minority inflicted greater and 
greater damage, the British government and Irish security forces faced a province at 
a breaking point. 
Long Kesh and the Maze Prison 
In 1971, three years into this culture of violence and instability, Northern Irish Prime 
Minister Brian Faulkner intensified the use of the Long Kesh military camp to serve 
as a paramilitary prison. In a sprawling, shadowy culture of political violence, difficult 
to monitor and even more difficult to eliminate, the prison was likely intended to 
isolate paramilitary members—particularly those of the IRA—from a society easily 
disrupted even by “low-level terrorism” such as car bombings and single murders 
(von Tangen Page 1998, 48-53). Faulkner’s government designed “Operation 
Demetrius,” August 9-17 1971, a major arrest operation intended to detain as many 
suspected paramilitary members (mostly Republican) as possible in a span of hours. 
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The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) rounded up individuals suspected of 
paramilitary activity in a performative fashion intended to intimidate potential threats 
to British control. They reportedly made their arrests loudly in the middle of the 
night, and transported detainees to the Maze with a processional flair. The British 
Army and RUC cited most of those detained (an estimated but poorly-documented 
350 men) on suspicion of conspiracy, terrorism, or possession of a weapon. 
Approximately 20% of detainees, however, were wrongfully arrested; that is, they 
were later found innocent of their original charge (von Tangen Page 1998, 54). 
Operation Demetrius had been carried out based on questionable intelligence 
gathered by the RUC Special Branch, which later admitted to the use of “speculation 
and guesswork” (Ryder 2000, 74). Irish security also arrested dozens of former IRA 
members and unaffiliated family members on the basis of their shared last name with 
a paramilitary member left at large. Under these circumstances, Long Kesh 
Detention Centre quickly filled past capacity. Over the coming months, authorities 
added structures to the compound in order to serve as a high-security prison, albeit 
ostensibly a temporary one. 
The Dirty War 
1971 also saw the implementation of tactical intelligence training courses for RUC 
members, employed almost immediately in Long Kesh. Suspects thought to hold 
anti-Loyalist information received dramatically different treatment than anti-Loyalist 
prisoners between the 1920s (that is, Irish partition and Civil War) and ‘60s. Edgar 
O’Ballance writes that this later generation of prisoners underwent: 
“Sensory deprivation,” wherein the brain is deprived of the constant 
supply of oxygen and sugar it must have to function; “bread-and-
water diet” to weaken physically; being “hooded” to confuse the 
senses; being deprived of sleep to tire the brain and body, and to 
lessen physical resistance to interrogation; and such apparatus known 
as the “Wind Machine” and the “Music Room” (Feldman 1991, 21). 
These techniques became known to RUC detectives as “deep interrogation,” and 
served as a component to Prime Minister Faulkner’s program to develop counter-
insurgency expertise in the RUC. Outside the barbed-wires of the Maze, 
paramilitaries (particularly the newest IRA splinter group, the Provisional IRA) 
would in turn train high-profile members, as well as any active members soon to be 
in danger of capture, in anti-interrogation techniques. 
Despite these efforts at resistance, internment and the claustrophobic prison 
setting gave RUC authorities access to information they could not have tapped on 
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the outside. A broader network of intelligence-gathering developed, spanning across 
the prison boundaries, in what Martin Dillon (1988) and others have called the 
“Dirty War”. Prison information-collecting systems not only mimicked the outside 
confusion of interrogations and infiltrations, but also served as the center where 
informants were made of combatants, and where political forces used false 
informants to create panic and paranoia in opposing sects. Most famously, the 
British government infiltrated the Crumlin Road IRA prisoner’s alliance, which then 
mistakenly fed the IRA members being held at the Maze a list of alleged 
“informants” who were actually legitimate IRA members. This led to the abuse of 
IRA members by other prisoners of the same group, and the ensuing days of 
prolonged interrogations, false admissions, and administrative hysteria nearly led to 
the collapse of several important branches of IRA hierarchy (Dillon 1988, 74-83). A 
culture of paranoia and mistrust escalated into violence even more easily within the 
confines of Northern Irish prisons than in the outside realm of low-level terrorism.  
A “University of Terrorism” 
Despite the sudden disruption of Republican activities that resulted from internment, 
and despite the RUC’s upper hand and efficiency in interrogation and information-
gathering within Northern Ireland’s prisons, the prolonged imprisonment of such a 
large number of Republicans was untenable at best. The consolidation of so many 
insurgents and alleged insurgents rendered attempts to keep them isolated from one 
another useless. In addition, there was no mixed housing of paramilitaries, for the 
safety of the guards and prisoners; internees associated with each of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Freedom Force, Irish 
Republican Army, and the Irish National Liberation Army were housed with their 
own affiliates.  
Without the staffing numbers or space to prevent it, the Maze became a 
“university of terrorism” (Ryder 2000, 50-51; 119). As the secretive “low-level” 
insurgency attacks continued outside the gates, the British government pressured its 
law enforcement to continue making arrests—often for unproven crimes, or for 
security breaches such as carrying, but not firing, a firearm (McEvoy 2001, 354). 
Within months of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members’ internment 
in 1971, their experienced leadership implemented a system of lecturing and militant 
discipline in order to recruit, radicalize, and train younger or unaffiliated internees. 
Young idealistic Separatists were arrested and, once inside the Maze, radicalized. 
Prisoners even recounted forging fake weapons to be used for instructional 
5
Dwiggins: Maze Prison/Long Kesh
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2016
purposes. The Maze prison lacked the design and staffing to enable officials to fully 
monitor, much less control, its prisoners. 
The fact that prison served as a systematic breeding ground for Republican (and 
to a lesser extent, Loyalist) extremism suggests more than the complications the 
Northern Irish authorities met in the counter-insurgency struggle. It also exhibits the 
institutionalization of terror in Northern Ireland during this era of conflict. The 
consolidated, classroom-like setting through which violence spread in this closed 
space brings into sharp focus the methodological practices of sectarian groups, and 
the role of recruitment and instruction in armed groups’ penetration into social 
establishments in the outside world. In a decade where ethno-nationalist groups 
controlled businesses, small banks, and even streets throughout Northern Ireland, 
the notion that a terrorist “school” could thrive even on regulated prison grounds 
hardly seems an aberration. Instead of “squeezing them out of society and into 
prison,” as Secretary of State Roy Mason would later put it (McEvoy 2001, 231), the 
RUC and British government created a new, over-concentrated and under-regulated 
space for the most dangerous actors in the Troubles to converge.  
Paramilitary Activity Outside the Wire 
The insurgent activity within the Maze was by no means purely theoretical. 
Considerable violence was conceived within the Maze and executed outside. From 
behind the prison walls, leading faction officers continued to design and delegate 
paramilitary orders. Furthermore, the RUC’s intensified usage of high-security 
prisons provided PIRA with easily accessed targets: prison officials and their families. 
Republican prisoners became invaluable for obtaining personal information about 
potential targets. In one 1973 collaboration between the “inside” and “outside,” a 
letter bomb was sent to the home of a warder, and opened by his mother (Ryder 
2000, 127). Paramilitary officials in the outside community also took action upon the 
prison itself, in correspondence with those inside. From outside the prison walls, 
paramilitary members threw pipe bombs over the wall, placed bombs along the gated 
perimeter, and smuggled ropes and other tools inside, reportedly with help from 
citizen allies in the Belfast area (McEvoy 2001; Dillon 1988).  
The Maze’s entrance consisted of three automatic gates, which only opened and 
closed one at a time and so had to be traversed in slow succession. Watchtowers 
stood erect on the perimeter, between segments of barbed and electric wire. And yet, 
the prison was a permeable area. When Republican officers developed militant 
orders amongst its members in prisons for distribution, they smuggled documents 
outside in the shoe linings and tampons of visitors (often coerced civilian family 
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members, or IRA members in disguise) (Dillon 1988). As long as the imprisoned 
ranks of paramilitaries kept open their communication vessels with the outside 
sections, they remained a functional part of the resistance against a British Ireland. 
This of course was possible in part because of the Maze’s proximity to Separatist 
Belfast communities. When Long Kesh originated as a military camp, it was 
reasonably built near the Northern Irish capital; when it was redeveloped into a 
detention center in 1971 and a high-security prison in 1976, it was not geographically 
suited to its new functions.  
Special Category Status and Protests  
In addition to the use of “deep interrogation” techniques, as well as grievances such 
as poor food quality and insufficient medical care, prisoners and their supporters 
protested the 1976 cancellation of paramilitary prisoners’ “Special Category” status 
under Secretary of State Merlyn Rees and chairman Lord Gardiner. The British 
government stripped paramilitary men of the right to wear their own clothes, to be 
excused from prison labor, to associate freely with other prisoners, and to receive 
regular mail and visits from family.  
This de-classification of prisoners, particularly in the IRA, threatened to remove 
them from the political sphere in which they claimed to now have a foothold. Sara 
McDowell paraphrases Foucault to argue that criminalization is a means to 
depoliticization (2009). A “Special Category” prisoner, essentially a prisoner of war, 
serves time for fighting for his beliefs and the unarmed civilians represented by his 
cause. A criminal is an isolated individual, as much a murderer as a freedom fighter. 
The government’s decision to downgrade paramilitary categorization suggested an 
effort to negate the prisoners’ legitimacy in the public eye, just as outside the Maze, 
the state treated paramilitary conflicts as a local, and not a national issue. The use of 
the army was withheld whenever possible, and Secretary of State Rees referred to the 
civil conflict not as a second Troubles or a guerrilla war, but as a period of 
“Ulsterization” (von Tangen Page 1998, 57-59). Both inside and outside the Maze, 
the national government treated Northern Ireland’s paramilitary violence and 
imprisonment as a criminal, not a political, problem. With their efforts for political 
recognition already tenuous, the Republicans protested what they believed to be an 
attempt by British parliament to render Republicans irrelevant in the public eye. 
When appeals to prison guards, and eventually to Margaret Thatcher, for political 
status went ignored or denied, an open subculture of Republican resistance formed 
inside the Maze prison—geared not toward the sole aim of a united Irish Ireland, but 
of political status. Claiming Unionist authorities had tyrannized prisoners out of both 
7
Dwiggins: Maze Prison/Long Kesh
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2016
political power and civil rights, Republican prisoners began a series of formal 
protests. The protest began with the “Blanketmen”, prisoners who, denied the 
Special Category right to their own clothes, in turn refused to wear the prison 
uniforms provided to them. They went naked or wrapped in a blanket. As one 
inmate, a member of PIRA recalls:  
The suit itself didn’t mean an awful lot. It was just material. The suit 
of clothes doesn’t make the prisoner, but it was symbolic. We were 
refusing point-blank then and there to put a uniform on which would 
give anybody a visual of us being different whatsoever (Feldman 
1991, 153). 
When Maze officials prohibited Blanketment from using the toilets unless they put 
on their uniform, the situation escalated into a “dirty protest,” in which Blanketmen 
lived in their own feces-covered cells rather than put on a uniform, be taken to a 
toilet, or have their cell cleaned.  
Prison officials adopted more severe tactics to “clean” their prisoners, including 
throwing pails of boiling water into the cells of naked men, using cleaning sessions as 
access to beat prisoners, and requiring an invasive “mirror” inspection of dirty 
protest prisoners’ rectums, as prison guards washed the cells. RUC doctors or 
psychologists provided their own rationalizations for these actions, but one former 
Maze Welfare Officer phrased his reasoning in the following way: “The quicker we 
break the men, the quicker we can bring in a humane system” (Feldman 1991, 186-
190). Other police guards later admitted to a sense of retribution in their behavior at 
the Maze; that is to say, prisoners were likely mistreated by officials who later 
reported insurmountable psychological stress, poor work environment, insufficient 
pay, the constant threat of one’s family becoming a PIRA target, and a dearth of 
alternative options, given the economic and unemployment patterns of the decade 
that led many employees to the prison in the first place (McEvoy 2001). 
Republican prisoners’ formal protests culminated in two hunger strikes in the 
Maze, the second of which resulted in ten deaths. Bobby Sands, sentenced to 14 
years in the Maze for possession of a firearm alleged having been used in an IRA 
attack, led the strike, refusing food for 66 days in 1981 (Bew, Frampton, and 
Gurruchaga 2009, 89). More than any other single event in Maze, his strike 
resounded with the outside world. When a rare Catholic-majority seat in Parliament 
opened five weeks into the protest, Sands was astonishingly elected as Northern 
Ireland’s youngest MP, from within prison (O’Day 1995, 20). Bobby Sands died not 
just a martyr in the eyes of his sympathizers, but a martyred member of parliament. 
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Nine more men would starve to death over the next months. Each of the 
strikers, under Sand’s leadership, strategically began to fast at two-week intervals. 
Republican recruitment and paramilitary activity spiked during the hunger strike. 
During this era of the conflict, Nationalist areas began to create the famous murals 
of Northern Ireland, and the visage of Bobby Sands appeared throughout 
sympathetic neighborhoods. When the body of Bobby Sands, MP, was brought out 
from the Maze, an estimated ten thousand people attended his funeral. One week 
later, as the nightly violence answering Sands’s death began to temper, another writer 
and the second of ten total hunger strikers died, reigniting the public response. 
Rioting, without official organization from the IRA or PIRA, struck up across 
Northern Ireland. The fine line between supporting IRA political status and 
propagating criminal activity blurred as the protests became dangerous, with 
government automobiles torched, passengers inside. The protests of self-infliction 
and starvation inside the prison, and the more established Separatist groups 
outside—both peaceful and violent—came to sustain one another. 
The 1981 Hunger Strike shifted the familiar points of conflict associated with the 
IRA and PIRA from enemy lines and government establishments to the bodies of 
individual victims, and the shift secured a positive opinion from parts of the 
Northern Irish, English, and American public (a public unlikely to support the IRA’s 
combatant activities, but one that followed the cause for political status in newspaper 
reports). During the series of formal protests, the well-reported invasion and 
deterioration of the Republican prisoner body also became a strong rallying and 
recruiting tool for Separatists outside the Maze, appealing to the current Republican 
constituency to continue the pursuit of human rights for their captured IRA 
members and the IRA’s ideology of a united Ireland. Although the Maze prison held 
members from Loyalist as well as Republican paramilitaries, the latter built a 
campaign around their particular experiences of trauma. 
Although a new tactic for this era of Republicans, the hunger strike as a general 
practice has a deep-seated history in Catholic Ireland, commonly attributed in part to 
a Celtic pride in the mission work of Saint Patrick, the nation’s patron saint, and 
other early Christians. More importantly, the 1981 strike echoed Ireland’s more 
recent nationalist traditions of martyrdom, such as the deaths of Wolfe Tone, leader 
of the failed Irish Rebellion of 1798, and of the executed leaders of the 1916 Easter 
Rising – another movement against British Ireland (Ford 2001, 66; Beiner 2014). The 
legacy of Bobby Sands hinges upon his status as a martyr, augmented by the explicit 
ties his prison writings make to Christianity, Irish nationalism, and to mythologized 
figures, including Wolfe Tone and 1916’s Patrick Pearse. In the first entry of his 
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hunger strike diary he recorded: “I believe and stand by the God-given right of the 
Irish nation to sovereign independence, and the right of any Irishman or woman to 
assert this right in armed revolution. That is why I am incarcerated, naked and 
tortured” (Sands 1997, 219). 
Maze/Long Kesh and the Public Consciousness 
It bears mentioning that little of what transpired inside the Maze could have 
significantly infiltrated the outside world if the prisoners had not written and 
ultimately published their accounts from within the prison walls. The Republicans 
built an entire propaganda series around Maze prisoners by writing and smuggling 
out letters, poems, and instructions. Although the Maze functioned as a high-security 
prison, it failed to put Republicans out of sight, out of mind. The quick mass 
internment, the blanket protests, the dirty protests, and the hunger strikes all kept the 
prison in the minds of the neighborhood, the Belfast community, and Northern 
Ireland. 
The physical landscape of the prison became another advantage of the 
Republican’s campaign, one they could not have orchestrated themselves. The prison 
stood on a 360-acre complex in Lisburn, a Loyalist Belfast suburb. The site consisted 
of large wings of cells that formed the “H-blocks”, a chapel, control center, and the 
hospital. Like other prisons, it had imposing watchtowers, wire over tall walls, and 
multiple gates that only opened or closed one at a time. Northern Irish civilians 
never saw the inside of the prison, but the sprawling campus stood fewer than 15 
miles from Belfast International airport and a few thousand feet from Motorway 1, 
the leading highway on the route from Belfast to Dublin. From the arterial roads 
around Belfast the Maze lights at night made a glow on the horizon, the way a small 
city would (McAtackney 2014). In the height of the prison’s presence in Northern 
Irish and international news, aerial views of the H-blocks were commonplace. In 
short, the site, although originally adapted from Long Kesh in order to “squeeze” 
prisoners out of society and the public eye, was a highly visible entity.  
The violence and trauma associated with the Maze/Long Kesh shaped much of 
the Troubles of the 1970s and ‘80s. This review of the circumstances and sub-events 
that comprise the Maze’s role within the conflict illustrates William Sewell Jr.’s 
contention that historical actors, an event’s subjects, “are willful, they vary, and are 
profoundly shaped by their cultures” (2005, 211). In other words, the armed struggle 
that took place in Northern Ireland did not inevitably happen; people of that time and 
place affected it.  The events that transpired in and around the prison in particular 
helped to radicalize paramilitary membership, establish political leadership symbols, 
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feed sectarian tensions, and influence popular opinion on the conflict itself.  As a 
place of interchange and conflict between Loyalists and Republicans, between 
combatants and prison officials, and between civilians and political actors, the site is 
ripe for contestation regarding the memory and lessons of 1969-1998.  
1998-2015: Contesting the Future 
The list of contested episodes at the Maze Prison extends beyond the era of the 
hunger strikers: IRA infiltration within Maze security, a large-scale Republican 
breakout in 1983, and the 1997 murder of an imprisoned Loyalist leader. The 
Troubles ended in 1998 when political parties, in consultation with paramilitary 
leaders, reached The Good Friday Agreement. It was largely exhaustion, rather than 
a civil reconciliation between sides, that made possible a successful peace agreement 
after years of hostility. After the agreement, British security infrastructure—
watchtowers and security points—began to come down (McAtackney 2014, 185-
195). It was, perhaps, a minimum requirement if signatories expected the 
paramilitaries to disarm. The Maze, too, gradually emptied as part of the peace talk 
agreement, and the last prisoner was released in 2000.  
As the five-year anniversary of the prison’s closing passed, and then the ten-year 
anniversary, the defunct Maze stood intact in Lisburn. The site was declared a public 
asset in the early 2000s, and its ownership passed from the Prison Service to the 
Northern Ireland Executive in 2004. This ensured that executive powers and formal 
jurisdiction over the future of the Maze site would be shared between the 
Democratic Ulster Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin; it would not, in other words, go up 
for private auction. As the major Republican political party of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, and a close political associate of the IRA, Sinn Féin claims a powerful 
interest in the Maze prison. It rose to political power following the popular support 
for the hunger strikers of 1981, and its president Gerry Adams served several years in 
the Long Kesh detention center after being suspected, but never convicted, of IRA 
activity. At the same time the politically Unionist DUP also claims a stake in the 
Maze, being closely aligned with the British government and sympathetic to the 
Loyalist cause.  
A broad web of stakeholders—including leading political parties, former 
prisoners, guards, victims of political violence and their descendants, professionals in 
cultural tourism and public history, and citizens invested in the legacy of the 
Troubles—shapes the recent past and the future of the site. The Maze’s role in 
Northern Irish memory has redirected to different purposes at different times, as 
today a less-terrorized Northern Irish society debates the fate of the structure itself.  
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An early Unionist proposal claimed that the defunct prison should serve a 
practical use as a recreational complex, which would benefit Belfast as well as 
compensate the residential community in the Maze’s immediate vicinity, largely 
Unionist. Certainly, the Lisburn City Council welcomed the economic promise of a 
42,000-capacity multipurpose stadium slated for the site. However, the stadium 
would require the redevelopment of almost all the prison grounds. The early plan, in 
short, was to eradicate most of the Maze Prison from Northern Ireland’s physical 
landscape.  
As others have noted, the obliteration of a historical site serves the political 
interests of those whose story is not represented by the landscape, or perceived not 
to be represented (McDowell 2009, Foote 2003).  It is important to note, however, 
that while hardline Unionists and politicians may have been inclined to erase a 
symbol of embarrassment to their government, not all supporters who called for the 
demolition of the Maze prison necessarily did so for the sake of erasing nationalist 
history. McDowell reminds us that the families of prisoners’ victims are haunted and 
grieved by the Maze (2009, 224). Other Unionists as well as Separatists supported the 
plan as a pragmatic revitalization opportunity, and as a signal to the world that 
Northern Ireland was taking positive steps to leave its violent past behind. This 
vision hinged upon the belief that the way forward in Northern Ireland’s period of 
recovery from the Troubles was through economic opportunity, tourism, and civic 
reanimation.  Reconstruction of the site began in 2006.  
While much of the Maze prison was bulldozed, the Environment and Heritage 
Service in the Department of the Environment listed an H-block of cells, as well as 
the administrative rooms and hospital, for protection (Gordon 2005). The argument 
that the prison was too vital a piece of physical history, and too valuable a Troubles 
case study to be destroyed, prevailed at the state level. The Maze stadium plan was 
ultimately overturned (Bloomfield 2009, 1) when the Sports Minister opted to pursue 
other options, citing a lack of popular and political support.  
The remaining structures were then, for a short-lived period of agreement 
between the shared executive powers, slated to exist alongside an exhibition space 
and a peace and reconciliation center, to be designed by Daniel Libeskind (Batty 
2010, 1). Libeskind famously designed the Jewish Museum Berlin and the World 
Trade Center redevelopment, among other buildings commemorating tragic events. 
In the mid-2000s, plans began for the exhibition space that now hosts Balmoral 
Park, developed over most of the former prison site, while the protected structures 
and a new peace center would uphold the historical legacy and lessons of the site. 
The precise nature of that legacy, the narrative such a center would present, was 
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unclear, but an arms-length body, Maze/Long Kesh Consortium, assembled to 
conceptualize the effort.  
The peace center complex struck a very different tone from prior proposals. This 
vision, reached by the joint shared executive, supposed that Northern Ireland’s best 
hope to progress from its civil conflict is through overt engagement with the past.  
While it would strain credibility to suppose a peace center alone would prevent 
periods of ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland’s future, as others have 
documented the historical failure of “atrocity heritage as prevention of recurrence”, 
the peace center concept proposed to transform a high-profile site of pain into a 
venue dedicated to peace and shared progress (Ashworth and Hartmann 2005, 261). 
The trauma of the Maze’s past lent stature to the site in this capacity; as Edward 
Linenthal has demonstrated (2001), “sacred ground” such as sites of suffering 
inspires national reflection and encourages citizens to evaluate the past as a means of 
defining contemporary conceptions of empathy—and perhaps in the case of 
Northern Ireland, of peace.  
Logistically, what remains of the Maze prison site is a suitable physical space for 
a serious global peace center. It is located near the capital, the government owns the 
site, and the European Union has previously shown interest in partially funding the 
project1. The acreage is large enough that the peace center could go up within a 
matter of years of other development at the site, sending the message that Northern 
Ireland confronts its past while moving forward with programs like the Balmoral 
agricultural show, which is in fact underway. The peace center is also touted by Sinn 
Féin as an economic opportunity and cultural tourism jackpot. 
However, after the relocation of the agricultural show to the former Maze site in 
mid-2013, the DUP severed the deal. The party withdrew its support for the peace 
center, citing the belief that any such center, any forum for competing perspectives, 
must be developed on politically neutral ground. As demonstrated earlier in this 
article, the Republican story has claimed the Maze, because the larger Separatist 
movement carefully crafted an identity associated with the experience of prisoners 
there. Sara McDowell contends that today’s Nationalist leadership aims to continue 
to use the Maze as a political resource (2009). “Heritage,” she paraphrases from 
Ashworth and Graham (2005, 3), “is widely accepted as the use of the past as a 
resource for the present,” and this does not exclude partisan use (McDowell 2009, 
226). Above all, parties opposed to the peace center worry the remaining structures 
of the Maze will enshrine the memory of Republican casualties. The fear of giving 
                                                 
1 This article was written before Great Britain voted to leave the European Union in 2016.  
13
Dwiggins: Maze Prison/Long Kesh
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2016
the public a material object or site of reverence is, of course, not particular to the 
post-Troubles leadership. Historically, governing authorities have taken precautions 
not to create historical sites through which the public may be reminded of conflicts 
over ethno-nationalist sectarianism. The same concern led the British government to 
bury the 1916 Easter Rising leaders in a single grave off a secondary road in Arbour 
Hill, which today remains off the edge of Dublin tourist maps.  
The particular experience of imprisonment, according to much of the DUP and 
victims’ groups, also renders the site unsuitable for any balanced, inclusive forum 
about the larger era of conflict. This is an important lynchpin of the Unionist 
argument against interpretation of the Maze. Certainly, no matter how large the 
hunger strikers loom in public consciousness, the majority of Northern Irish people 
who suffered from 1969 to 1998 were never prisoners at the Maze. However, to 
assume that the stories from inside the wire are aberrations, and that the day-to-day 
stories in the rest of Belfast are the real or representative picture, is a false 
distinction. Not only were the walls permeable, linking the outside world to the 
activity inside, but the prison itself existed as part of the greater Troubles, and the 
society that bred the conflict. “What consequences events will have,” William Sewell 
Jr. writes (2005, 199), “depends on how they are interpreted, and that interpretation 
can only be made within the terms of the cultural structures in place.” In other 
words, circumstances create historical actors, who then enact a response—be it 
armed struggle, imprisonment, protests and other resistance, or a state response to 
violence. Contested areas of Northern Ireland created an abnormal societal 
environment for years, and landscapes like the Maze Prison grew from that larger, 
traumatized culture.  
Other realities render the site’s capacity for healthy engagement difficult to 
predict. Northern Ireland is not many years into a period of political stability. As one 
BBC Ireland Correspondent put it, “the veneer of normality is thin” (Murray 2013). 
Suicide rates among men who were young during the conflict doubled in 1998 after 
the Troubles officially ended (Morrissey 1999). In 2015 the threat of riots from both 
sides of the conflict threatened civil peace during the annual parade season. As we 
consider the long history of Anglo-Irish relations that preceded the last thirty-year 
era of civil conflict, we are reminded that no period of peace in what is now 
Northern Ireland was a guarantee to future decades. Certainly since the turn into the 
20th century, in every era of tenuous stability the country was on the verge of unrest. 
Looking backward from today’s comparative peace, Northern Ireland and the greater 
island face a pattern of stability and violence stretching far enough into the past to 
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make anyone wary of installing an explicit reminder of the bitter sectarianism that 
has made the Maze Prison infamous. 
Public History Professionals and Interpretive Possibilities 
That pattern, however, is in other ways an argument for the peace center. In 
previous decades, the expertise of public historians did not play a prominent part in 
the Northern Irish peace efforts. Fortunately, the capacity of truth and reconciliation 
councils, museum professionals, oral historians, landscape architects, and other 
trained professionals is much greater today than it was twenty or even ten years ago, 
and may enhance the ongoing peace efforts with concentrated effort. A tremendous 
amount of work has been done on the ground already; the peace center would 
formalize and extend these efforts. Prior to the halting of peace center plans, a three-
year consultant project gathered stories and perspectives from Belfast and other 
Northern Irish communities impacted by the Troubles and the Maze. Meanwhile, 
longstanding grassroots projects have connected communities to one another in the 
wake of the greater Troubles, and international consulting partners have already 
expressed an interest in the future of the Maze site. Among the many relevant 
organizations are Healing Through Remembering, a collective of community groups 
in Northern Ireland; Falls Community Council, the host of an extensive oral history 
archive; and the International Sites of Conscience. A Belfast-based oral historian 
observed that when it comes to the Maze, “professional discussions have a sense of 
movement that political discussions don’t have” (Hackett 2015). In the event the 
government picks up again the question of interpretation or public access at the 
Maze, any agreed-upon program will require public historians to continue their 
herculean efforts. 
As we have seen, the future of the Maze requires input from all stakeholders 
including politicians, prisoners, guards, their families, residents in the direct vicinity 
of the site, and crucially, victims’ families. Kenneth Foote notes that any 
commemoration of a tragic past will feature victims and their families at the center of 
the debate (2003, 342); however, the emotion and tension of any such project will be 
mitigated by the inclusion of religious leaders, planners, professional designers, and 
trained historians. Ultimately, it should be the role of the public historian and other 
mediators to design a flexible mode of inquiry into the conflict, among invested 
parties and visitors. 
This will undoubtedly call for sensitivity and pedagogical creativity. Others have 
written on the varied purposes of heritage, in particular the educational role. Citing 
Nelson Graburn, Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, 38) list the three qualities of 
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interpretation: auratic (or numenous), didactic (educational), and sociable. The first 
two are the primary complications of interpretation at the Maze. Unionists will not 
allow visitors to visit the Maze prison for an awe-inspiring experience in the hospital 
room where Bobby Sands died. When party leaders declare there can be no “shrine” 
to the Republican prisoners, they evoke Duncan Cameron’s observation that for 
many years, museums served exclusively as temples to their subject, not as forums for 
discussion (2012). In the late 20th century, he called for museums to facilitate civic 
dialogue and interactivity with their community, utilizing every opportunity to 
generate a shared authority over the subject at hand. This approach benefits 
communities as an alternative to “top-down” education that may or may not 
resonate with visitors.  
The didactic, or educational, function of a peace center or interpretive site is of 
course a challenging issue. What is the message of the site, and how much control do 
the content managers have over how it is received by visitors (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth 1996, 28)? A forum seems the obvious goal of any peace center or 
“neutral” historical site, but what are its structure and parameters? Sara McDowell 
makes an important distinction (2005, 226) between interpersonal forums that invite 
visitors to interact with one another to understand other perspectives, and conflict 
transformation that asks visitors to individually evaluate “their own ideas about the 
origins, realities, and consequences” of a conflict. The remains of the Maze prison, 
should they be slated for educational purposes again in the future, will challenge 
visitors to actively participate in the peace process. 
Sinn Féin leader Raymond McCartney has stated to the public, in support of a 
peace center narrative, “we shouldn’t be [afraid] of competing perspectives” (The 
Nolan Show 2013). Certainly, comments such as these are received with skepticism by 
Unionists (perhaps Sinn Féin leadership, like the DUP, believe that once the visitors 
are on the grounds the remaining Maze structures will be understood as pro-
Nationalist). However, a productive forum might realistically be constructed from 
these competing perspectives, if leadership over the forum is distributed across 
diverse political stakeholders, and if this leadership entrusts trained professionals 
with the process. With the professionalization of public history and the rise in 
expertise in memory and national trauma, Northern Ireland is perched at a rare 
opportunity to facilitate public understanding of a multiplicity of perspectives.  
Whether the critical factors and political decisions will align to this opportunity 
remains to be seen. Today relations between the power-sharing executives, Sinn Féin 
and the DUP, are strained by a decade of debate over the future of the Maze. Most 
of what remains of the peace center discussions is Sinn Féin’s embitterment by what 
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it refers to as a broken DUP promise, one that resulted in the withdrawal of 18 
million EU dollars from the project. Sinn Féin leadership has in its turn withheld 
support for construction of an access road to the Balmoral exhibition space. As we 
have seen, the Balmoral agricultural show-goers tread on contested ground; in 2015, 
the annual traffic faced by visitors to the agricultural show proved a stubborn 
reminder of the political gridlock. Opposition to the interpretation of the Maze up to 
this point, as much as support for it, may be best considered a healthy, if stagnated, 
prerequisite to an appropriate compromise. Kenneth Foote suggests (2003, 343) that 
in the face of a shadowed past, we must treat the debate as part of the grieving 
process. As of 2016 the burden falls upon Northern Ireland’s executive to facilitate, 
rather than stifle, forward movement in these discussions. 
The Maze/Long Kesh in Comparison 
From a broader perspective of historical suffering, HM Maze/Long Kesh holds no 
monopoly on the issues of violence and memory, or on the difficult challenge of 
managing a site of trauma. In fact, considered in relation to detention camps 
associated with genocide and indiscriminate state violence, the Maze has been called 
“a statistical footnote in the global heritage of pain” (Graham and McDowell 2007, 
cited in McDowell 2009, 224). Furthermore, there seems to be little argument for its 
culturally aesthetic value, unlike more diverse historical campuses or sites, such as 
Robben Island, associated with the triumph of human rights (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth 1996, 58).  
However, what remains of the Maze site could be tremendously useful to cultural 
and historical understanding in Northern Ireland. The protected prison structures 
constitute a rare addition to the historical record. Generally, historians examine the 
Maze and the larger Troubles through paper documentation—prison writings, 
photographs of public and prisoner protests, extensive oral history transcripts, 
newspapers, and governmental reports—nearly all of which filter through some 
degree of narrative before it reaches their hands. Laura McAtackney emphasizes that 
“our understandings of how prisons work are guided and constrained by government 
records and official documents created by the regimes who police and administer 
them” (2014, 57). And we have already seen the overtly political purposes for which 
prisoners create their own accounts. There are definitive limitations to our 
dependence upon written documents. If accessible, the remaining H-block, chapel, 
hospital, and administrative building add archaeology and material culture to the 
historical record and to the public experience. If opened to the public, the physical 
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structures may complement the now-tabled peace center with a dimension of 
immersion very few formal museums achieve.  
The Maze site would also hold a particular position among memorials of 
Northern Ireland’s civil conflict as a purportedly shared site, commemorating a place 
of daily conflict between historical actors of all Northern Irish stripes: that is, of 
diverse national, religious, political, and paramilitary identity. By contrast, the high-
profile events of parade season serve citizens with distinct identities, to the exclusion 
(often to the inconvenience) of others. Artists render the famous murals of Northern 
Ireland in reference to specific combatant groups, or other figures that represent 
Unionist or Nationalist causes. Furthermore, Neil Jarman observes (2002, 293) that 
in recent years the murals have undergone a transition from resolved or 
confrontational images to depictions of sorrow or remembrance; in either case, the 
murals look pointedly back into the past. A forum-style peace or education center 
devoted to the Troubles, however, would serve the distinct purpose of looking 
backwards and forward at the same time, unlike strict memorials. The Maze prison 
site, although it may not evoke the spontaneous or exclusively citizen-driven 
commemoration of the murals, has the capacity to offer a more nuanced 
understanding of a greater multiplicity of perspectives than other high-profile forms 
of commemoration in Northern Ireland.  
As a prospective cultural site, the Maze prison may not compare with the severity 
of the world’s darkest histories, but it is of tremendous value in the context of 
Northern Irish history and commemoration. What remains of the prison landscape 
may serve Northern Ireland as a uniquely potent site for public engagement with the 
memory of the Troubles (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, 105). Whether it will 
warrant global attention as a tool for peace depends upon the decisions made and 
executed regarding its future. 
Conclusion 
The violent episodes of the Maze—internment, paramilitary and informant activity 
(both inside and across the prison wire), protests, and public response—illustrate the 
extraordinary relevance the prison maintained in the era of civil conflict. Rather than 
being “squeezed out” of Northern Irish society, the inmates of Her Majesty’s Maze 
Prison were effectively engrained, a permeation of the boundaries between the free 
nation and the men behind the wire. The mutual dependence between Northern 
Irish paramilitaries inside and outside the camp and the prevalence of the Maze in 
the public mind manifested in an environment of fear, paranoia, violence, and 
resistance that reflected the social upheaval throughout greater Belfast and Northern 
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Ireland. Ultimately, stories of the Maze Prison carry all the more potency because the 
Troubles have not diminished into historical or ancestral fact. For many citizens 
today, the conflict is a firsthand memory, the defining event of their lives for many 
years. The Maze Prison holds a multitude of meanings, as a site of conscience, of 
mythology, of exhaustion, and of embarrassment. 
This is not a history that will die with the last generation of witnesses; the 
historical facts of the Maze and the Troubles will live on whether or not the state 
invests in shaping their memory. Anyone who lived through the Troubles can agree 
that the Maze prison was the historical site of a painful and prolonged era, but can it 
serve as a productive cultural site today? In all likelihood, the answer will hinge 
squarely on the execution of the project. If Northern Irish communities, their 
leadership, and trained professionals are able to generate a discussion that not only 
tolerates but welcomes competing perspectives, the prison site may prove to be an 
extraordinary untested opportunity.  
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